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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mët.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Neo-Sc.* = *Revue Neo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Limits of Effective Legal Action. ROSCOE POUND. *Int. J. E.*, XXVII, 2, pp. 150-167.

The history of law shows that the problem of enforcement of law is the problem of the intrinsic limitations of effective legal action. We can treat the development of law under five headings. (1) Primitive laws, in which the moral and legal are undifferentiated and law exists mainly to keep peace among groups of kindred. Abstract justice is secondary; the limits of enforcement are the primary consideration. (2) Strict law, where abstract justice is formulated in terms of inflexible rules. The moral aspects of a situation or of conduct are disregarded, and the field of operation being thus limited there is no problem of enforcement. (3) Law of equity, representing the infusion of purely moral ideas into law; the individual as the moral unit becomes the legal unit; the attempt is made to make the legal coincide with the moral law, and consequently the problem of enforcement becomes acute. Magisterial discretion gains too wide a scope and justice becomes too personal and uncertain. (4) Maturity of law. Law is once more embodied in determinate rules and limited to a definite sphere of action. Equality and security are the keynotes, equality through the certainty of rules, security through the maintenance of property and contract. The problem of enforcement is again solved through the limitation of the sphere of action and by relegating certain aspects of human conduct and relations to social control. (5) Our contemporary situation; which has much in common, as is illustrated by striking parallels, with the stage of equity. Legislation is once more attempting to cover the whole range of human relations and again the problem of enforcement becomes critical. The situation demands an analysis of the limitations inherent in the administration of justice according to law. The first set of limitations arises from the difficulty of determining the facts, complicated by the exigencies of jury trial. These difficulties prevent the law

from securing the full rights of personality. The intangibility of duties puts great strain upon legal action and involves very often, as in the case of juvenile offences, the creation of various administrative agencies whose effectiveness is dubious. The subtlety with which many important interests are infringed makes legal action difficult and the cases arising from these infringements tend to make the law ridiculous. Legal machinery is inapplicable to many human relations; thus conjugal rights have no external sanction today beyond the moral sense of the community. Finally, legal action is limited by the necessity of appealing to individuals to set the law in motion, a limitation lessened to some extent by the institution of the public prosecutor, but not entirely removed. Much progress has been made in the art of drafting legislation, but the life of law is in its enforcement and the law-maker must keep in mind not only the form of the rule and the abstract justice of its content but all the conditions of its enforcement.

WM. E. BINGHAM.

Liberty and Democracy. H. B. ALEXANDER. *Int. J. E.*, XXVII, 2, pp. 131-149.

The European War, resulting in the shattering of Europe's humanitarian ideals, forces on Americans a critical examination of our notion of liberty which is based on those ideals, and forms the foundation of our political thought. Edward Meyer, the famous historian, has recently suggested that our boasted freedom is only an illusion, and this suggests that our examination might fruitfully begin with a consideration of the German ideal of liberty. Meyer remarks that the German and the Anglo-Saxon ideals of the State are opposed, and this leads us to suspect that we have here the basis of the opposing ideals of liberty. Hugo Münsterberg has expressed this German view of the State in the terse statement that the state exists not for the individuals, but the individuals for the state, which is a living being above all individuals, an over-individual soul. According to this point of view, liberty is public and not private; the freedom of the individual will consists in its agreement with the will of the state. This view of the state is diametrically opposed to the French, English, and American, and the German notion of liberty is to the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon no liberty at all. The Germans gain, no doubt, for this lack of personal freedom by 'efficiency.' Prussian militarism is a feudalism whose basis is not liberty but loyalty, and necessarily excludes the notion of equality. The writer questions the truth of the German conception of the cosmopolis and of the polity based thereon. The universe is not exclusively mental and spiritual, the exercise of the reason itself is dependent upon the existence of material, or irrational, factors and situations, and the essence of freedom is to make a rational choice. It follows that the utterly 'efficient' state can be neither rational nor free; political reason can exist only among free citizens. Although reason is thus conditioned by a material situation, yet it is essentially a condition of withdrawal from the material and physical; it is consequently anti-social and individual in character.

The realization of ideal values demands not only individual liberty but also individual detachment, therefore reason is to be sought in democratic, and not in collectivistic states; the over-individual state is a monstrosity, the Prussian militarism is a modern feudalism despiritualized and imbruted by a conception of the state in which there is no true reason or true humanity. Seeking a foundation for a positive estimate of true democracy according to true principles of rational liberty we note first that historically democracies have been short-lived. It is easier to act than to think, consequently democracy tends to degenerate into a mob. Plato remarked that an evil democracy was the least evil of all evil states because least efficient but he depreciated a good democracy for the same reason. But, we ask, is efficiency the measure of goodness? Law and justice are expressions of imperfection; they are definable only in terms of irreconcilable conflicts. Democracies are possible only where some strife exists; this is the secret of their instability. Does this render democratic liberty impossible? Can we maintain organization for material interests and avoid organization of ideal interests? Such an achievement is possible only on the basis of a clearer conception of law and justice. "Law, in the state, is the equivalent of self-control in the individual; justice is the equivalent of the restraint of reason and the love of truth. . . . Liberty is the delicate equilibrium of life, and like all life it is a state of individual souls." Justice is a perpetual will which should be directed to rendering each his due and to defending in and for each his right. This will is possible of cultivation only in democracies, but there is a question as to whether it can be maintained, and there are indications that in the United States we are failing to do so. The only remedy is that attempted by Socrates for the Athenian democracy, the personal inspiration of personal thought.

WM. E. BINGHAM.

Quietism. RUFUS M. JONES. *Harvard Theological Rev.*, X, 1, pp. 1-51.

Quietism was the most intense stage of European Mysticism. There are, for Quietism, two levels in the universe. One level is 'nature,' which is godless and ruined. The other level is the supernatural. Man is depraved. Consequently, nothing divine can originate in man as man. The Quietist sought to be free from all efforts of self direction. He sought the complete 'quiet' of the 'creature,' the crucifixion of self. Then out of this state of pure repose, in which the mind thinks and desires and wills nothing, divine movings will spontaneously come. Passivity is thus only a condition of divine moving. Quietism does not mean inaction. The soul which is directed by a divine principle can accomplish wonders. Quietism, moreover, implies intense spiritual action. All the powers of consciousness are brought into complete focal unity. This state of concentration is reached by a single mighty act. When the state is once reached, the soul becomes a living center of receptivity into which God flows, and where He takes the place of the crucified self and guides the individual's actions. In this complete concentration, the mind takes no note of its own processes. Pure prayer is a unitive

state in which all thoughts and desires are banished. It is a total absorption in God. Pure faith is without any definite beliefs or expectations. Pure love loves nothing finite or particular. It seeks no return and loves for the sake of love alone. Prominent in Italian Quietism was Miguel de Molinos. He was born about 1627 in Spain, but lived much of his life at Rome. In 1675, he published his *Guida Spirituale*. There are two stages of spiritual life, meditation and contemplation. In meditation, reason is operative. The attention is fixed upon the central truths of Christianity. Contemplation does not begin until there is a complete absence of thought and of effort. The soul enters perfect peace, fearing nothing, desiring nothing, resting in unselfish love and wordless prayer. The soul must do without enjoyment, and even without signs of divine favor. The Holy Spirit operates unhindered only in an absolute silence of thoughts and in a complete absence of all self activity. The quieter I keep, therefore, the better all things succeed. Molinos gathered numerous disciples. These tended to discount the value of church services. Many Quietists believed that one complete surrender to God would bring grace enough to continue through all eternity. The church finally decided to stamp out Quietism, and Molinos was arrested. Quietism spread widely, however, in Spain, Italy, and France. The prophetess of French Quietism was Madame Guyon, who was born in 1648. After having once had a deep spiritual experience, she passed into a period of spiritual desolation, in which she lost all sense of the divine presence. She emerged, however, with a richer experience than before. She reached a state of perpetual union with God. "Her-self" was dead, and a "God-self" came to take its place. Formerly, her will had submitted to God; now it had disappeared entirely. She was only a passive divine instrument, moved from within. One of her books, *Les Torrents Spirituels*, was written automatically by a movement which she could not resist. Before writing, she did not know what she was going to say. As she wrote, she found herself relieved. Madame Guyon shows many hysterical symptoms, and many of her actions appear foolish to us. But there is a real spiritual power in her notwithstanding her mental disorder. She regarded herself as sent to be the instrument of a far-reaching spiritual reformation. Madame Guyon exercised a great influence upon Fénelon. She felt that she was destined to prepare him for great spiritual leadership. Fénelon was much more cautious and conservative in his Quietism than was Madame Guyon. He had great respect for her, however, and refused to join in condemning her when she was imprisoned. Fénelon was a strange mingling of the man of the world and the saint, but he was really striving to promote spirituality. Quietism was an attempt to find a direct union with the Infinite without the mediation of priests and sacraments. Thus the movement had Protestant tendencies. Quietism, however, shows the foolishness of regarding man as depraved and of trying to annihilate human powers. The religious life succeeds only as the personality is developed. Quietism, moreover, was too abstract to be translated into real human life.

MELVIN RIGG.

L'idéalisme positif. DR. GRASSET. Rev. Ph., XLII, 2, pp. 171-189.

Positive Idealism is the application of the positivistic method to the idealistic principle. This idealism does not deny the objective reality of matter. All *knowledge* of reality is referred to the thinking subject, but not all reality. Positive Idealism studies matter, but always by the medium of the psychical human fact. Positive Idealism does not enter into metaphysical discussions, and can be reconciled in practice with either Spiritualism or Materialism. The purpose of Positive Idealism is to establish a philosophy founded upon positive science, which shall have the authority of a science and which can be universally accepted by men without damage to their freedom of thought. Positive Idealism must be based on human biology, or the positive study of man. Previous attempts to reconcile Idealism with science have started with general biology or even with universal science. Such attempts can lead only to the negation of psychology, morals, and sociology, because they do not distinguish human phenomena from other phenomena. In defining the psychic phenomenon, I wish to consider only the material element in human functioning. The nervous system receives external energy, stores it, transforms it, and then sends it out to the exterior. When this process is immediate, the act is reflex. When the process is prolonged, the act is psychic. Psychic phenomena have their seat in the cerebral cortex. The word 'psychical' is more general than the words 'conscious' and 'mental.' The psychic phenomena of somnambulism and hypnosis remain subconscious. The psychic function of man should be divided into psychism superior and psychism inferior. The act of composing an article is an example of psychism superior. The act of the typist is an example of psychism inferior. It is automatic and unconscious, but yet psychic. The two psychisms are generally associated. Emotions contain two kinds of elements, psychical elements and non-psychical elements. Both are physiological. Much light can be thrown on the emotions by the study of these non-psychic elements, but such a study cannot take the place of a study of the psychic emotional state itself. The psychic and the physiological are not two distinct orders. There is no sudden break from the physiological to the psychical the moment that the nervous current passes into the cortical neurone. Psychic phenomena are different in some respects from non-psychic physiological phenomena. Each type is susceptible of a distinct type of study. But psychical phenomena are physiological phenomena, and are capable of a positive scientific study as are the non-psychic physiological phenomena.

MELVIN RIGG.

Sur quelques formes de nos efforts. J. PHILIPPE. Rev. Ph., No. 493, 1, pp. 37-59.

What are the elements which, in their diverse modalities, constitute the different forms of our efforts? Philosophers and psychologists differ greatly in regard to this question, and an inquiry into the common use of the word 'effort' helps but little. In physiological terms description is easy; it is an

act necessitating an expenditure of muscular energy beyond our ordinary measure; "it consists in displaying at a given moment an intense muscular contraction in order to overcome a considerable obstacle." (H. Beaumis.) The common type here is thoracic effort. The real moment of effort in this process is the final one, when the exercise of muscular energy brings into action our osseous levers against a resistance in order to overcome it, because this puts our energies to work beyond their usual limits. Corresponding to this activity there are internal, invisible modifications of tissues which are fundamental to it, the circulatory and glandular systems which stand between our nervous organization and the muscular. Behind all this physiological apparatus, however, we have as ultimate fact a mental adaptation; there is with man no effort without a certain play of intelligence. But the analysis of the physiological stages is necessary for an understanding of the mental determinations which are their inner face. For the physiologist effort can be analyzed into elements, but it presents itself to consciousness as a perfect unity. One of the essential elements of effort, whether sensorial or intellectual, is preference, a mind open to some ideas, closed to others. Effort is essentially active and spontaneous; it cannot be induced by purely abstract ideas, nor can it be realized by cerebral, intellectual, or moral habits. These are merely auxiliaries. It implies the unknown, it is an attempt to realize what is not habitual, to make quality of energy prevail over quantity, to pass beyond the power at our disposal, thanks to a new organization whose essential element is of the mental order. An analysis of effort into its principal degrees reveals four principal stages. (1) The inhibition at the beginning of effort, analogous to the act by which we limit the field of vision in order to fix an object, which prepares for the exercise of our activity by a kind of delimitation. (2) The putting to work of our energy within the field thus limited. Here the factor of personality is dominant, since the effort can only succeed in realizing the forms of activity already developed by our personal habits. (3) The essential character of effort is however to surpass the banal rhythm of daily life; it commences where we actually surpass ourselves. In this sense we may say that effort always involves a risk as we are employing unknown forces; consequently it supposes, and gives us, a completer consciousness of ourselves. (4) The elements which mount from the depths of our spontaneity at the moment effort is realized, a rising state of energy to the point of the emergence of our personal activity, and an expenditure of energy which surpasses without destroying the rhythm that an intelligent experience makes us adopt as the law privileged to exercise our forces. In the last analysis the ultimate element of effort is a form of energy at once representative and a rising state issuing from our experience, in accord with it and yet surpassing it. It is a reflective impulse of growing initiative, an exercise of our personality and of our will, in order to make them accomplish more than we believe possible.

WM. E. BINGHAM.

L'idéalisme de Taine. R. LENOIR. Rev. de Mét., XXIII, 6, pp. 859-878.

Amid the diversity of Taine's writings, produced no doubt by the diversity of influences which were brought to bear on his thinking, two dominant, though partly contradictory, tendencies must be noticed, the one leading him toward positivism, the other toward an assertion of the rights of reason. These writings were not intended to give his philosophy a systematic form, and yet a unity of direction can be traced in them. (I) Taine's Intellectual Development. Although Taine had little taste for the particular sciences, the most important characteristic of his mind was an enthusiasm for clear and definite ideas which could be proved once for all by scientific logic. He placed no faith in the emotions, nor in intuition; nevertheless his purely logical imagination was tempered by the great flexibility of his intellect. A study of Spinoza and Kant and an acquaintance with German romanticism and French positivism made him cognizant of all the tendencies which were dominant in nineteenth century thought. Accepting these influences, he became their master and did not lose his independence of spirit. (II) The Metaphysical Conception of Nature. Taine's metaphysical position may be defined in terms of the official philosophy (eclecticism), which he combats, and the philosophy of immanence, which he accepts. He is too critical and not imaginative enough to appreciate fully the beauties of romanticism, but it is from Hegel that he derives the elements of a doctrine of substance and causality. He begins by accepting the Spinozistic theory of substance, and, realizing the problem of the relation of God to the world which that conception raises, solves the difficulty by adopting the Hegelian theory of development and immanence. Development for him, however, is not purely logical, but a living evolution of forces by means of which the world presents not only a unity of organization, but also a unity of composition. Reality manifests itself to us in particular things, which possess individuality and so appear undetermined and free, but, since there is not a particular substance underlying each phenomenon, all the events of the world, including psychical facts and social facts, are under a strict necessity. A cause, furthermore, is an active, productive force, not necessarily a metaphysical entity, but a condition internal to a group of facts by means of which they are explained. Thus he agrees with Hegel that knowledge is possible because the truth is in things, the real is the rational. (III) The Scientific Conception of Nature. The publication of *L'intelligence* marks a new departure in Taine's thought. Influenced by the reaction against Hegelianism, he turns away from a *priori* metaphysics toward science and a study of contemporary philosophers. He agrees with J. S. Mill that bodies have no existence apart from the sensations they produce, but holds that matter is not only the possibility of sensations but the *necessity* of sensations. Further, he identifies necessity with force, claiming that the world of the physicist is a system of forces, which are the real subject matter of thought, while the sensations arising from them are illusory. Behind the thing there is an idea; behind the phenomenon, a law; behind the particular, a universal. But for him the logical movement of

thought is not synthetic, but analytic and deductive. Mathematics affords us the true example of reason, since all judgments are equations, or substitutions of terms. Furthermore, experimental science is of a piece with mathematics, their differences being only apparent and not essential. It follows, therefore, that all the laws of nature can be regarded as manifestations of the law of the conservation of motion, and that they derive their necessity from their analytic character, that is to say, because the truth is in things and motion itself is a modification of thought.

F. W. A. MILLER.

La logique de la médecine, d'après Cabanis. F. COLONNA D'ISTRIA. Rev. de Mét., XXIV, 1, pp. 59-73.

In all the works of Cabanis the inspiration is eminently practical and social. His writings bear directly on the two principal problems whose study forms the introduction to the philosophy of medicine. What are the limits of the certainty to which medicine can pretend? What is the method which should assure its development? Cabanis analyzes with great precision all the difficulties which oppose the constitution of medicine as a science. The first of these is the mysterious character of life itself. The doctor must resign himself to be ignorant of the nature and first causes of disease, unless one means by first cause the positive conditions of the appearance and development of the disease. A greater obstacle lies in the diversity of diseases and the complexity of their character. There are however a few elements which, by their multiple combinations, produce the illusion of an infinite variety. The analysis of these can serve as a basis for what Cabanis calls the symptomatic method. As to the practical difficulty of defining the nature and action of remedies, Cabanis replies that one cannot claim for medicine the certainty of calculus and that time and effort will finally bring a decision on debatable points. Medicine is the work of nature and has in nature its eternal basis and means of perfection. Medicine has reached according to Cabanis a decisive phase in its history; the time is propitious to accomplish in this domain a reform comparable to that of which Descartes has been the promotor in general philosophy. In other words, in the medicine of the past ideas pretended to dominate facts, in the medicine of the future it will be the facts which will impose their reality on the intellect. Cabanis makes analysis, in method, fulfill the function at once of classification and interpretation, giving it under four heads: (1) Descriptive analysis; (2) Analysis of decomposition; (3) Historical analysis; and (4) Analysis of deduction. In medical discovery the most efficacious generally is historical analysis. Deduction is absolutely certain only where the data are limited and invariable. In regard then to the logic of medicine the ambition to investigate first causes is illusory and dangerous. There are phenomena whose succession is regular and this order forms the only legitimate object to which the investigation of medicine may be applied. In relation to method, however, medicine like the other sciences is tributary to philosophy and owes to it its unity.

VIRGINIA BAKER.

Ueber Einheit und Fortschritt des Menschengeschlechts im Welt-Krieg 1914/16.

ALFRED WOLFF. Ar. f. sys. Ph., II Abteilung, XXII, 2, pp. 103-117.

The title seems contradictory and meaningless in view of the present situation. But before the year 1914 internationalism, the thought of the unity of the human race, had arisen from multiple reasons, from common ecclesiastical and religious feelings, from cosmopolitanism resulting from a narrowing of the world, etc. The question that faces us is: Are there not still in the midst of the war surviving effects of this time of 1914? And one can answer it in the affirmative.

Wars are today wars of whole peoples in the sense that the whole people is drawn into them in sympathy, that the life of the individual is the existence of the nation. It is the burden of the war and the intensity of the participants which forms the basis for a fundamental feeling which no living being can escape. Its effect is shown in the internal affairs of the states; in the appeals of the nations which recognize no parties, in the relation of the individual in general to the state, a relation which has everywhere become closer. It is true also that in the province of the war itself, its form and means are not so different as might be supposed from the internal condition of the states. The states in this world war are in the last analysis brothers of a national family, one of which is younger, not mature enough for the hard struggle, others are too old and therefore summoned to die, others, again, come forth in the full bloom of their strength, therefore the victory falls to them. In the last class are the Germans. Thus is explained the superiority of the Germans, thus also is explained the fact that there is a certain level attained by all in equipment and preparation, in tactics and strategy. This unanimity is seen even in the style in which military despatches are written, similar in their brevity, in their actual or feigned tendency to truth. Various are the theories of justification for this struggle: (1) the war is one of existence; (2) a war of defense; (3) a just war to equalize fortunes; (4) a holy war waged by Islam. But each nation is firm in the belief that it is a chosen people. In the way the nations judge one another as opponents we find to be universal, not merely the lack of understanding, the attempt at generalization, but also a determined scheme of judging. Here the general tendency is to underrate the enemy and his fortunes and achievements. But there is a brighter side to this resemblance of the warring nations, in the provisions which all have made in war, such as the laws forbidding alcoholic drinks during mobilization. It has been proved moreover that, even in a war as great as this, states can hold out financially through a re-organization of political economy, through the institution of loans and other devices. Thus even the hostile nations involuntarily betray the essential unity of the world.

VIRGINIA BAKER.

Skizze über begriffliches Denken und Anschauung. M. LEWINSKI. Ar. f. sys.

Ph., XXII, 3, pp. 197-219.

(1) The Method of Philosophy. From the very beginning, two conflicting tendencies struggle against each other in the history of philosophy. The

first, which finds its classical representative in Plato and those of the Greek philosophers who place the concept at the heart and center of spiritual life, may be called the mythico-religious school; the other, represented in Greek thought by Democritus, lays more emphasis in constructing a theory of reality on the clearness obtained from the perception of successive phenomena, and may be designated as the tendency toward rationalistic clarity. In modern times, although certain considerations still need to be advanced in its defence, the latter method seems to have taken the ascendancy. The psychological analysis of the thought processes is appealed to for the solution of all philosophical problems, and yet criticisms of this identification of philosophy and psychology arise everywhere. Some hold that, since psychology has a different subject-matter, it cannot ultimately answer philosophical questions. But this objection is peculiarly short-sighted, for, if the two disciplines differ in this respect, we need to be told with what objects philosophy concerns itself. Others claim that philosophy deals with questions of value and validity, and that these matters do not admit of psychological investigation. This, however, is clearly a *petitio principii*, for there is no approach to these questions except that of psychology. In fact, the attack on the reduction of philosophy to psychology goes back as far as Kant, but even he, as well as his followers, could not dispense with psychological observation and analysis in developing their metaphysical positions. Without going into the question of the relative merits of experimentation on others versus introspection in psychology, it seems safe to say that psychological considerations alone will give clearness and certainty to the treatment of philosophical problems.

(2) The Concept. (Der Begriff.) The concept is one of the most important mediums by which the human mind proceeds in its activity, and, therefore, should be made the subject of a careful psychological analysis in order to determine its nature and its relation to the spiritual life. The popular consciousness falsely considers the concept to be a representative image, and associational psychology, when it describes the concept, as a fusion of perceptual and memory images, does not get very far beyond this view. The concept is, however, much more than an image. Its differentiating characteristics are accuracy, stability, and validity, while the particular images arise and decay in an untrustworthy temporal succession. The concept may be defined, then, as an element of thought considered as definitely related to a causal system of reality. Its meaning is expressed in a causal law; its content, and test, is found in particular things; its function is to mediate between the two, giving individuality to the latter and validity to the former. As such the concept stands as the unifying principle of thought.

(3) Time and Space. Intuition and Thought. From one point of view, time and space must be considered as empirical conceptions. Particular things have a temporal quality, that is, they follow each other in temporal sequences, just as they have color, and this quality abstracted from them is the concept of time. Likewise the concept of space is formed by abstracting from the juxtaposition, size, and shape of particular objects. To consider

space and time as *a priori* intuitions in the Kantian sense would be to destroy the conceptual unity of the thought life for which we have contended. But there is another point of view from which space and time must be considered as intuitions. Over and above the transitory temporal and spatial relations of objects is a duration of time and an extent of space, which are immediately apprehended in their unity and eternity. Duration and stability are just as much qualities of objects as is change, so that through the whole manifold of changing phenomena there runs a unified duration of time as such and a unified extent of pure space. By the combination of these two elements, the unity in variety, the identity in difference of the space-time world as definitely related to the causal system of reality is embraced by conceptual thought.

F. W. A. MILLER.

In welchem Verhältnis steht Spinozas Lehre von Leib und Seele zu der seiner Vorgänger? JOHANNES DRÄSEKE. Ar. f. G. Ph., XXII, 2, pp. 144-169.

Setting out with the principle of methodical doubt, Descartes convinced himself of his own existence, of the existence of God, and of the existence of the outer world. The latter consisted of bodies whose essence was extension, and which were entirely opposed in nature to soul. Extension and soul were two mutually exclusive substances. God, however, was substance in the absolute sense, while matter and mind were only substances relatively to each other; each could be conceived without the other. These two substances were united in the human being, especially on the emotional side of man's nature. Thus, in regard to the passions, Descartes said that in a sense the soul was in every part of the whole body. However, for Descartes the soul was especially related to one part of the brain, the pineal gland, from which it received sensations and through which it directed movements. Descartes' successors were unable to find this solution satisfactory. De la Forge denied any natural connection between body and soul; Clauberg attributed to the soul a miraculous influence over the body, and to the body an occasionalistic causality over the soul; Cordemoy gave the will a merely occasionalistic power over the body; while Geulinx completely denied the possibility of mutual influence, and affirmed an occasionalistic relationship directly dependent upon God. Malebranche took what was substantially the same position. Thus we find the idea of God as the sole substance, which was to be Spinoza's great principle, coming to the front in the development of occasionalism. Spinoza made God the one substance and lowered body and soul to the rank of attributes. Bodies and souls became *modi* of the divine substance. In his *Short Treatise*, however, Spinoza was still under the power of the Cartesian theory, and taught a doctrine of mutual influence mediated by animal spirits. In the *Short Treatise* soul and body were inseparable parts of one whole, and their unity was especially manifest in the passions, as it was for Descartes also. In the *Ethics* Spinoza teaches that each mode may be viewed under infinite aspects, two of which are known to us, thought and extension. As for Des-

cartes souls were substances, of which ideas were *modi*, so for Spinoza God was the substance, of which thought was an attribute, and souls were *modi*, or *ideas*. The unity of body and soul is the unity of idea and object, for the human soul is the idea of the human body. There can be no interaction between soul and body, for they are two aspects of the same thing. Has Spinoza solved the problem? As motions cannot become sensations, Spinoza can never explain sensation, nor the knowledge which arises from it. On the other hand, God, as the infinite substance, cannot be known, and thus human knowledge, adequate and inadequate, is impossible. Spinoza's assertion that no one understands the action of soul on the body, suggests the insolubility of the problem. Although Spinoza's solution is unsatisfactory, no better solution has been brought forward.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

Die realen Grundlagen der Hegelschen Philosophie. GUSTAVE KÖRBER. Ar. f. G. Ph., XXII, 2, pp. 179-192.

The craving for a world-view which will give life a spiritual foundation is bringing about a renewal of Hegelianism. It is doubted, however, that this imposing system itself rests on firm foundations. What are the bases of the Hegelian system? Hegel is held to have founded his system upon pure thought. But even if his system were founded upon pure thought, it would not necessarily be without purchase on reality. But Hegel's system does not start from pure thought, but from thought inseparably united with experience. Hegel said that the universal was the truth of sensible experience. He held that we were driven to mount from the particular to the universal by the '*Gang der Sache selbst*.' The real is the concrete individual, the synthesis of universal and particular. Hegel's method does not need to appeal surreptitiously to experience, for it conceives thought in inseparable unity with experience from the start. The dialectical method takes up the content of the empirical sciences and suspends their immediately given character, rendering them intelligible. Understanding divides concrete realities into opposed phases, which thereupon contradict each other and themselves; this contradiction is resolved in a higher unity, which takes up and preserves the truth of the previously contradictory aspects. Thus Being, abstracted from Nothing, becomes Nothing, and Nothing, abstracted from Being, Being; the reality lies in Becoming. This does not mean that any determinate being has and has not Being, but that abstract Being is Nothing. A better example is the relation of Infinite and Finite. The two are inseparably united; if they are separated, the Infinite becomes Finite, and *vice versa*. The synthesis is the Infinite grasping itself *and* the Finite in itself. In the same way Essence and Appearance are related to each other. Thus the dialectical method has its fundamental value. The Hegelian system rests on a solid basis, and comes as near to truth as is possible with our faculties.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

Nietzsche als Philosoph und die Philosophie unserer Tage. ALFRED WERNER.
Ar. f. G. Ph., XXIII, 1, pp. 66-78.

The first period of the Nietzschean philosophy involves a mystical conception of the universe strongly influenced by the pessimism of Schopenhauer. During the second period his positive philosophy was developed which, in opposition to that of the former period, recognized the importance of actuality and truth. In a short time, however, Nietzsche came to recognize only that truth which concerns itself with the furtherance of life. The results of the last period, while they have the appearance of being scientific, are really the product of the passionate, metaphysical judgment of a poet. A review of Nietzsche's life-work quickly reveals the numberless contradictions and sharp antitheses characteristic of the poetic nature.

Modern philosophy, as characterized by Wilhelm Wundt, reacting against the post-Kantian idealism, has begun to base its theories once more on the actual facts of sense-perception. What is now essential to philosophy is not the exclusion of the various sciences but the recognition and adoption of the methods of science. The task of philosophy, in contrast to that of logic, is the clarification of the basic principles of all science by pointing out the universality of their nature. Nietzsche did very little in the field of philosophy as thus defined, but if life and world problems are admitted to its jurisdiction he stands out as a mighty land-mark. He must, as a matter of fact, be understood and criticized as a poet, not as a technical philosopher, and he must be judged on the basis of his life-work as a whole, not on any one product or period of his life.

CHARLES H. WRIGHT.